about what he regarded as the religiosity in Faulkner's *A Fable* (1954): not "pure shit" but "impure diluted shit" (qtd. 189). "I cannot help but think," Hemingway wrote Lillian Ross, "that people who talk about God as though they knew him intimately . . . are frauds" (qtd. 188).

For his part, Faulkner remained forever adamant about his 1947 ranking of Hemingway as fourth or fifth among their contemporaries. On at least three later occasions—in an interview with Breit in the *New York Times Book Review* (January 30, 1955); during a talk in Nagano, Japan (August 1955); and at the University of Virginia (1957–58)—he reiterated and elaborated on the matter. He placed Wolfe first, he told Breit, "because he tried to do the greatest of the impossible, . . . to reduce all of human experience to literature. And I thought that after Wolfe I had tried the most. I rated Hemingway last because he stayed within what he knew. He did it fine, but he didn't try for the impossible" (qtd. 145). And in his other discussions of this ranking issue, Faulkner similarly dispensed the faint praise that was sure to arouse his fellow author's ire. As George Monteiro succinctly summed up the matter: theirs was a contest "that, in the last analysis, showed neither of them to good advantage" (qtd. 209).

Faulkner and Hemingway: Biography of a Literary Rivalry begins and very nearly ends with bullfighting. The book's epigraph, an extended passage beginning with "Bullfighting is worthless without rivalry," comes from *The Dangerous Summer* (1960), Hemingway's account of the mano a mano competition between two great bullfighters—Antonio Ordóñez and Luis Miguel Dominguin—during the summer of 1959 (1). In the final chapter, Fruscione circles back to that topic, on the grounds that "Faulkner is very much present in *The Dangerous Summer*, psychologically if not textually" (209). Hemingway attached himself to Ordóñez during the series of bullfights that summer and regarded him as a master of the art. He "had the three great requisites for a matador: courage, skill in his profession, and grace in the presence of the danger of death" (qtd. 211). For Hemingway, whose capacities as a writer were flagging in the face of physical and mental disturbances, Ordóñez became a model of the ideal artist he could no longer be. Dominguin, in contrast, was gifted but overly reliant on tricks, on showiness instead of discipline.

Even if the similarity between the two *toreros* and the two writers is not articulated in the text, it is patent nonetheless, especially in light of Hemingway's initial published salvo across Faulkner's bow in *Death in the Afternoon*, his 1932 book on the art of bullfighting. In one of his dialogues with the inquisitive "*Old Lady*," Hemingway refers disparagingly to what he regarded as the overly prolific publishing record of Faulkner, the sensational aspects of his subject matter, and the wordiness and lack of control in his prose: "My operatives tell me that through the fine work of Mr. William Faulkner publishers now will publish anything rather than try to delete the better portions of your works, and I look forward to writing of those days of my youth which were spent in the finest whorehouses in the land amid the most brilliant society there found" (qtd. 64). The reference is to Faulkner's brothel scenes both in *Mosquitoes* (1927) and more famously in *Sanctuary* (1931). True art, by way of implication, required discipline and control, rather than such performative writing.

Having introduced this material, Fruscione goes one step farther, finding a handwritten comment in the original typescript of *Death in the Afternoon* that did not appear in the text of the book. The passage in the book ends this way:

> *Old Lady:* I must buy [Faulkner's] works.
> Madame, you can't go wrong on Faulkner. He's prolific too. By the time you get them ordered there'll be new ones out.
> *Old Lady:* If they are as you say there cannot be too many.
> Madame, you voice my own opinion. (qtd. 64)

This is manifestly sarcasm, and the sentence in Hemingway's hand that is not included in the book expresses an admiration for Faulkner clearly at odds with the tone of the passage: "It is a damned fine thing to have him writing and pleases me greatly" (65).

That may have been as generous a comment as Hemingway was capable of setting down about a man with whose work—at the opposite stylistic pole from his own—he felt himself in constant competition. Nor was it easy for Faulkner to cast off his own feelings of rivalry. You might think "it's too bad" that they could not have been kinder and more judicious toward each other. Or you might conclude that "that's the way it had to be" between them, as they sweated the words down on paper.

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RALPH ELLISON AND KENNETH BURKE: AT THE ROOTS OF THE RACIAL DIVIDE. By Bryan Crable. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2011. xvi + 242 pp. $22.50.

Bryan Crable's *Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke: At the Roots of the Racial Divide* examines Ralph Ellison (1914–94) and Kenneth Burke's (1897–1993) complex, five-decade friendship through relevant published works and the two men's sparse but charged correspondence. The Burke-Ellison friendship is one often cited but rarely explored at length, the only other book-length study of the relationship being Beth Eddy's *The Rites of Identity: The Religious Naturalism and Cultural Criticism of Kenneth Burke and Ralph Ellison* (2003). While Eddy usefully explicates parallel themes in their respective writings, she hesitates to put the two writers into direct conversation with one another. Crable, alternatively, focuses explicitly on moments and texts that bring the two thinkers into an immediate dialogue with one another and directly tackles the complex, fraught, and admiring engagements between them. Because of his interest in how the friendship speaks to the work and vice versa, *Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke* alternates among literary biography, textual analysis, and sociology. Crable aims to explicate what he calls, quoting Burke, the "corresponding mystery of communication" that is revealed when we encounter "any variants, however twisted or attenuated, of embarrassment in social intercourse" (113).

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Crable sees the tense relationship between his two subjects and the rift that separated them during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s as emblematic of the difficulty of speaking across the racial divide in America. In his account, antagonistic perspectives on the issue of race fractured the friendship despite the best intentions of both men and their mutual admiration for one another. He contends that the "Burke-Ellison relationship was, through and through, American" (4). Unpublished (and often unsent) correspondence between Burke and Ellison constitutes the raw material at the heart of Crable's argument. In his survey of this biographical intersection, he also considers both men's magnum opuses, Burke's *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950) and Ellison's *Invisible Man* (1952), as public extensions of their private and persistent dialogue about race. The ongoing, contentious, and frequently stalled conversation between the two men culminates in Burke's late essay from the 1980s, "Ralph Ellison's Trueblooded Bildungsroman" (1987), which he wrote as if it were a private letter to Ellison. While Crable has at the kernel of his book an interrogation of Burke and Ellison's complex and contentious friendship, he ultimately uses this interrogation to develop an evaluative argument about Burke's inability to see race as anything other than a gridlocked dialectic and Ellison's attempts in his essays to formulate what Burke was unable to—an ultimate vocabulary of race.

In chapter 1, "Birth of an Ancestor," Crable ably and succinctly rehearses Burke and Ellison's biographies, concentrating upon familial origins and the racial and regional context in which each writer was raised. He is careful to elaborate the various kinds of social hierarchies in which both men were implicated during their youth, experiences that returned in their respective approaches to the problem of race. Because the book aims more fully to acquaint Ellisonians with Burke, Burkeans with Ellison, and general readers to each, Crable presents material here that will be familiar to scholars. But while the facts in this chapter may be mostly familiar, Crable's elegant interweaving of them is not.

Chapter 2, "Antagonistic Cooperation," continues in a primarily biographical mode and details the burgeoning relationship between Burke and Ellison in the 1940s. The friendship was forged when Ellison—at this time a young writer increasingly dissatisfied with the unreflective pieties of the radical left—sent Burke a long, dense, and deeply considered letter regarding the latter's essay "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle' " (1939), which Ellison had heard him deliver at the Third American Writers Conference in 1939. This letter and Ellison's incipient friendship with the literary critic Stanley Hyman promoted Ellison's inclusion into the circle of writers that surrounded Burke in New England. Crable skillfully assembles published work and unpublished correspondence to delineate the intellectual milieu forged by Ellison, Burke, Hyman, and Hyman's wife, the novelist and short-story writer Shirley Jackson, as well as the complex questions of race that Ellison's own history introduced into this circle.

Crable continues with a reading of Ellison's early essay "Richard Wright's Blues" (1945), which he published seven years before *Invisible Man* and which demonstrated to many that Ellison was an intellectual and writer worth taking seriously. Although critics typically read the essay in relation to Richard Wright, Crable insists that, because the critical frame and vocabulary are so thoroughly Burkean, the essay is ultimately less important for understanding Ellison's relationship to Wright than it is for understanding his incipient friendship with Burke: "I believe [the essay] cannot be understood apart from Ellison's appropriation and application of Burke's insights" (56). The essay, therefore, represents another addition to Ellison's ongoing dialogue with Burke. After reading it, Burke responded to Ellison's argument in a letter to Hyman, which Hyman then relayed to Ellison. This, in turn, occasioned a letter from Ellison to Burke, which insisted on the value of group identity and the individual's inability fully to transcend racial categories in the interest of universality. It provoked the older man. Crable marshals unpublished letters and draft materials to show that Burke made several aborted attempts to compose a reply to Ellison's missive. He goes on to claim that Burke's monumental *A Rhetoric of Motives*, which was in the early stages of composition when Burke read Ellison's letter, was substantively influenced by both the letter and his reading of Ellison's essay on Wright. In fact, Crable argues, Burke's interpretation of Richard Wright in *A Rhetoric of Motives* and his famous citation of Ellison's essay constitute Burke's long-deferred reply to his friend.

In chapter 3, "From Acceptance to Rejection: *Invisible Man*," Crable discusses how Ellison's interrupted correspondence with Burke informed the composition of *Invisible Man*. He reads Ellison's novel as "his published response to Burke, his award-winning (even 'epoch-making') contribution to their ongoing conversation" (87). After contextualizing the novel's genesis and composition, Crable details Burke's influence on the form of the novel and its characters. Most significantly, he elaborates the deep, structural influence of Burke's tripartite sequence for transcendence (poiemata, pathemata, mathemata, or purpose, passion, perception), which informs the shape of Ellison's novel at every turn. Crable claims that these terms offered Ellison a way "to combine narrative progression with the logical progression of 'the act, the sufference or state, the thing learned' " (83). He then offers a reading of the novel, persuasively arguing that *Invisible Man* constitutes Ellison's extended engagement with and his retort to Burke's *Attitudes Toward History* (1937). Deploying both material evidence that Ellison closely read Burke's text during the composition of the novel and textual evidence of where and how Burke's text insinuates itself into *Invisible Man*, Crable constructs a persuasive argument for the degree to which Ellison was not merely building on a Burkean foundation in his novel but actively wrestling with his literary ancestor as well.

While Crable devotes the first three chapters to providing a thorough, balanced, and highly readable account of the tumultuous five-decade friendship of Burke and Ellison (a friendship that lay fallow for most of the 1950s and 1960s), he reserves the last two chapters for a more critical account of each subject's approach to the racial divide. These proceed dialectically toward Crable's own more rigorous account of race in the book's final pages. In chapter 4, "Was Kenneth Burke a Racist?," Crable grapples with Burke's reading of race in an American context. Crable's answer to the title of the chapter is a definitive, "No, but . . . ." In it he offers a complex and nuanced reading of Burke's brief reference to Ellison in *A Rhetoric of Motives*. This close attention to the reference enables Crable to dismantle earlier critical accounts that use it as evidence of Burke's racism. He, thankfully, is more interested in understanding how a Burkean critique of Kenneth Burke's

understanding of race in this text reveals that Burke was "plagued by a limited (and limiting) racial discourse, one haunting his perception of the American social order" (136). Burke, he claims, failed to see the possibility of an ultimate vocabulary of race because he had become too thoroughly immersed in the intractable racial binarism of the era. Ellison, however, through his assumption of a Burkean vocabulary and his particular application of it to his own experience, managed to transcend his ancestor and suggest what an ultimate vocabulary of race in America might be.

In chapter 5, "From Turmoil to Peace: An Ultimate Vocabulary of Race," Crable not only elaborates Ellison's theory of democratic identity and racial division but also utilizes the insights of Burke and Ellison to intervene in the current dialogue about race in America. He alerts his reader in a footnote (214) that he has opted to treat Ellison's nonfiction synchronically as a unitary body of work. For the purposes of his argument, this proves a useful approach. He synthesizes Ellison's substantial output as an essayist into a coherent quasi-Burkean philosophy of race and democratic identity. Crable provides one of the few clear and equitable summaries of Ellison's understanding of race extant, and he takes Ellison seriously as a philosophic thinker who "treat[s] race as more than a sharply drawn line in the sand" (139). Ellison, he claims, without negating racial difference, "focuses our attention upon the shared humanity buried beneath social dichotomies, and thereby hints at his adoption of an ultimate vocabulary" (139). Crable respects the complexity and particularity of Ellison's democratic vision, a vision that has often been reduced by his detractors to naive optimism and empty flag-waving. But Ellison does not escape critique. Crable applies a Burkean frame to Ellison's nonfiction and finds that, although Ellison's diffuse, occasional essays gesture toward an ultimate vocabulary that would transcend social division, they fail fully to achieve such promise because they locate the origins of the American racial divide in the establishment of the American Constitution and neglect to articulate the pre-political motivations for racial division. Crable promises to extend Ellison's vision "toward the symbolic conditions motivating the production of racial binarism" (150).

Crable then proceeds to provide a concise and lucid overview of the current state of racial discourse. Despite his admiration for the strides made by scholars who argue for race as a purely social construct, he observes that this argument has become simply another position in the parliamentary debate on race and has thus failed effectively to transcend the initial dialectic. Social constructionists, he argues, have not dealt effectively with the fact that we continue to perceive race as a natural fact and that separating the symbolic realm from the nonsymbolic through the division of "race" into the terms "race," "ethnicity," and "culture" has failed effectively to dissociate social construction from biology. In fact, in the case of the U.S. census, many people are utterly confused, which speaks to the fact that old symbolic constructs cannot be easily dissolved through the multiplication of categories. The intractable problems that have emerged out of these earnest efforts bespeak the need for an ultimate vocabulary of race. Despite its best efforts, the discursive intervention "merely generates another polarity—in this case, racial binarism versus social construction" (161).

Crable reserves the last section of his book for elaborating his own provisional account of an ultimate vocabulary of race, one that "works to resolve entrenched parliamentary disputes" (164). He asserts that "ultimate terms" are "mythic" and that myth, by virtue of being pre-ideational, "pushes through dialectical disputes, toward their originating ground." It "reconciles the competing social or political motives of the dialectical realm by symbolizing their common source" (162). Crable critiques Ellison's mythmaking gesture in his essays for "focusing upon America's birth" and thereby failing "to recognize the more primary question of the 'outside or beyond' of our social order—the archetypal origins of the racial discourse at work prior to our Declaration of Independence" (166). Crable's own attempt at an ultimate vocabulary derives from the Ellisonian insight that we are responsible for our own participation in symbolicity. Race, he argues, is but one symbolic construction of many, and our collective aim should not be to disavow it, but to recognize our collective need to locate symbolic distinctions in natural fact. Instead of evading this motivation, we should take responsibility for it. This, Crable says, is the trick that Ellison's essays finally teach us, "not to seek a way out of distinction, hierarchy, and order; the trick is to embrace the responsibility inherent to our social order. . . . To flee this responsibility is to cheat ourselves, and others, of our full humanity" (173).

For all there is to recommend *Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke*, the book suffers from an oversight that troubles Crable's critique of Ellison. This is Crable's neglect of Ellison's unfinished novel, *Three Days Before the Shooting . . .* (2010). Ellison worked on this—his sophomore effort—for over four decades. Crable briefly acknowledges the existence of the text, but hastily dismisses it in one short paragraph and a brief footnote (140). A portion of Ellison's manuscripts (edited substantially in the interest of readability) was published as *Juneteenth* (1999), but *Three Days* marks the most comprehensive view to date of Ellison's fictional output after *Invisible Man*. Given Crable's insistence on the importance of an "ideal myth" (172) to the articulation of an ultimate vocabulary of race, it is surprising that he did not turn to Ellison's second novel. Its central narrative traces the history of a visibly white boy of unambiguous racial heritage who is raised by a Negro preacher. The boy, Bliss, eventually abandons both his church and his racial identity and heads west to become a filmmaker. As an adult, he exploits his racial ambiguity and facility with sermonic utterance to enter into politics, and he becomes a prominent, racist, New England senator. One suspects that this story, with which Ellison struggled for the latter half of his life, represents a more potent "ideal myth" for how he conceived the construction of racial identity. One necessarily wonders how this story, which is fundamentally a tale of evasion and responsibility, either affirms or challenges Crable's critique of Ellison's essays. These are not matters that Crable need have addressed at great length, but his insistence on the centrality of the mythic register to the articulation of an ultimate vocabulary and his critique of Ellison's mythic reading of American history in the essays would seem to necessitate at least some consideration of the particular myths that consumed Ellison in his late fiction. Ellison's own insistence throughout his career that his most important contributions to American letters and to the civil rights movement would be novels suggests that if he were extending his own vision of democratic identity and racial division in America beyond what is evident in his essays, it would likely be detectable in his unfinished novel.

Nevertheless, *Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke* is a welcome and invaluable contribution to Burke scholarship and Ellison scholarship alike. Crable demonstrates definitively the depth and mutuality of each thinker's engagement with the other and all but requires future readings of Ellison's work to account for this complexity. The unpublished correspondence and marginalia that Crable has painstakingly organized, contextualized, and presented is a remarkable feat and will undoubtedly enrich the work of future critics of both writers. Finally, Crable's own analytic coda, his attempt at articulating an ultimate vocabulary of race, marks a provocative and worthy addition to the epistolary drama at the center of the work.

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THE LETTERS OF ERNEST HEMINGWAY: 1907–1922. Ed. Sandra Spanier and Robert W. Trogdon. New York: Cambridge UP, 2011. lxxxiv + 431 pp. $40.

It is sometimes hard to believe that a mere thirty years have passed since the publication of Carlos Baker's *Ernest Hemingway: Selected Letters, 1917–1961* (1981). Before Baker's volume, scholars had to rely for Hemingway (1899–1961) correspondence upon phrases and lines cited throughout Baker's own authorized 1969 biography and upon a smattering of letters to Gertrude Stein, Edmund Wilson, and F. Scott Fitzgerald printed in full in volumes devoted to those figures. *Selected Letters* collected 581 missives stretching from the author's late adolescence to the depression that would lead to his suicide at the age of sixty-two. Astonishingly enough, the book received mixed reviews upon publication, with Irving Howe in the *New York Times Book Review* (March 29, 1981) writing:

> Simply as pieces of writing to be valued for style and thought, Hemingway's letters are not very impressive. No one is likely to rank him with such great letter writers as Keats and Chekhov, Byron and T. E. Lawrence. Hemingway dashed off his letters as relief from the tension of writing stories and novels. Except to readers attached to the mysteries of hunting and fishing, a good number of his letters must seem trivial; still others will be of no concern to anyone but the man who wrote them and the people who received them. (7)

Despite such grumbling, *Selected Letters* was as quintessential a scholarly companion throughout the 1980s as *A Moveable Feast* (1964) or *The Fifth Column and the First Forty-Nine Stories* (1938; superseded by *The Complete Short Stories* [1987]). I received my copy at age seventeen, long before I ever thought of a career in academia, and it was vital to teaching me the hitherto-unimaginable idea that letters were as central to the romance of reading, the imagining of the literary life, as a writer's primary texts. In other words, Howe was point-blank wrong: Baker's collection demonstrated

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that Hemingway correspondence was of *more* concern to just about everyone but "the man who wrote them and the people who received them." Its impact is most measurable in the immense difference between pre- and post-1980s Hemingway scholarship. Thanks to *Selected Letters*, the criticism became less formalistic and more contextual, less concerned with symbols than with history, and—quite surprising since most hardly thought it possible—even more autobiographical.

One suspects that another thirty years hence we will feel similarly about *The Letters of Ernest Hemingway*. The present volume inaugurates this long-awaited series, which has been a decade in the making and will likely take at least another and a half as it extends through a dozen more volumes before its completion. Administered by Sandra Spanier at Penn State University, the Hemingway Letters Project (as it is known) is a collaborative effort between the Ernest Hemingway Foundation and Society, Cambridge University Press, and the Hemingway Estate, whose support of the effort has been wholehearted and generous. As Spanier reveals in her introduction to the series, the Project has thus far gathered letters "from nearly 250 sources in the United States and abroad, including more than 65 libraries and institutional repositories, and more than 175 dealers, private collectors, and Hemingway correspondents" (xxii). To put in perspective the thousands of individual items thus indexed, consider Howe's blunt insistence that in *Selected Letters* "fewer would have been better." Yet the 581 items Baker included is not much more than the 472 *alone* that Spanier notes that Hemingway addressed to his Scribner's editor Maxwell Perkins throughout their twenty-plus year association (xx). Factor in the hundreds of different correspondents with whom the author exchanged letters, and the shortsightedness of Howe's insistence that Baker should have adopted as his motto a line from a 1945 Papa letter ("It wasn't by accident that the Gettysburg Address was so short") becomes clear. There are many facets of Hemingway left to discover, and this book is the first step toward discovering them.

As coeditor Robert W. Trogdon notes in his introduction to the volume, the period 1907–22 encompasses four distinct periods: Hemingway's "childhood in Oak Park [Illinois], and in Michigan; his young adulthood in Kansas City as a cub reporter and in Italy as an ambulance driver; the postwar interlude in Michigan and Chicago from 1919 to 1921 as he strove to become a professional author; and the beginning of his true literary apprenticeship during his first year in Paris in 1922" (lxi). A quibbler might suggest that the end of 1921, when Hemingway embarked for Paris three months after marrying first wife Hadley Richardson, marks a more natural break for this particular volume; to bring us into the first year of his dizzying transformation from the aspiring novice who cranked out apprentice dreck such as the unpublished "The Passing of Pickles McCarthy" to the budding, assured short-story author of "Up in Michigan" (1923) and "My Old Man" (1923) is to tease us a bit by making us yearn to trace the development of the magnificent stories of *In Our Time* (1925). The editors' logic, however, is that 1923 marks the official beginning of Hemingway's career since it was the year he made his debut with *Three Stories and Ten Poems*, the 58-page, 300-copy limited edition published by Robert McAlmon's Contact Editions.

So the story of Hemingway's literary rise will have to wait until the next volume. In the meantime, *1907–1922* follows in critical letters the formative relationships